We derive a simple relation between a quantum channel's capacity to convey coherent (quantum) information and its usefulness for quantum cryptography.
• Creating shared information between a sender and receiver, information that is reliably secret from any third party and can thus be used as a cryptographic key for later private communication.
(The use of quantum channels to aid in cryptographic tasks such as key distribution is called quantum cryptography.)
Each of these tasks can be performed in the presence of noise. Indeed, in quantum cryptography the noise is of central importance in revealing the activity of an eavesdropper. Deutsch et al. [1] examined the security of quantum cryptographic schemes over quantum channels that contain noise. They pointed out that any protocol which allowed "entanglement purification" between two parties automatically provided a means of communicating secret information that no third party could share. Here we will continue this line of thought by showing that the privacy of the channel, measured by the amount of information available to the receiver that is not available to any eavesdropper, can be made at least as great as the channel's coherent information [2] .
Suppose Alice prepares a quantum system Q in an initial state ρ Q . Alice conveys the system Q through a noisy quantum channel to Bob. The noisy channel may be described by a superoperator E Q , so that the final state ρ
. The evolution of the channel given by the superoperator E Q is in fact unitary evolution on a larger quantum system that includes the environment E of the system. This environment may be considered to be initially in a pure state 0 E . In this case, the superoperator is given by
We can assume that the environment is initially in a pure state without any loss of generality, since we can always imagine that a "local" environment in a mixed state is just part of a larger system in a pure entangled state. We imagine first that the initial mixed state ρ Q of Q arises from Q's entanglement with some other "reference" system R in Alice's possession. Alice's goal in sending Q to Bob is to establish some quantum entanglement between her reference system R and Bob's output system Q ′ . That is, Alice is sending quantum information via the channel to Bob. As discussed in [3] , the entropy exchange S e measures the amount of information that is exchanged between the system Q and the environment E during their interaction. If the environment is initially in a pure state, the entropy exchange is just the environment's entropy after the interaction-i.e., S e = S(ρ E ′ ), where ρ E ′ is the final state of E. (The entropy here is just the ordinary von Neumann entropy of a density operator, S(ρ) = −Trρ log ρ.) The entropy exchange is entirely determined by the initial state ρ Q of Q and the channel dynamics superoperator E Q ; that is, the entropy exchange is a property "intrinsic" to Q and its dynamics.
The coherent information I e , introduced in [2] , is given by
The coherent information has many properties that suggest it as the proper measure of the quantum information conveyed from Alice to Bob by the channel. For example, I e can never be increased by quantum data processing performed by Bob on the channel output, and perfect quantum error correction of the channel output is possible for Bob if and only if no coherent information is lost in the channel [2] . The coherent information seems to be related to the capacity of a quantum channel to convey quantum states with high fidelity [4] . Alice might on the other hand be using the channel to send classical information to Bob. Alice prepares Q in one of a set of possible "signal states" ρ Q k , which are used by Alice with a priori probabilities p k . The average state ρ Q is given by
Bob receives the kth signal as ρ
Because the superoperator is linear, the average received state is
Bob attempts to decode Alice's message (that is, to identify which signal state was chosen by Alice) by measuring some decoding observable on his received system Q ′ . The amount of classical information conveyed from Alice to Bob, which we will denote H Bob , is governed by the quantity χ Q ′ , defined by
This quantity is significant in two ways:
• H Bob ≤ χ Q ′ , regardless of the decoding observable chosen [5, 6] .
• H Bob can be made as close as desired to to χ Q ′ by a suitable choice of code and decoding observable. To make H Bob near χ Q ′ , Alice must in general use the channel many times and employ code words composed of many signals; Bob must perform his decoding measurement on entire code words. The net result is that the channel is used N times to send up to Nχ Q ′ bits of classical information reliably [7] .
In short, χ Q ′ represents an upper bound on the classical information conveyed from Alice to Bob, an upper bound that may be approached arbitrarily closely if Alice and Bob use the channel efficiently.
If this general picture is used to describe a quantum cryptographic channel, then the eavesdropper ("Eve") must be supposed to have access to some or all of the environment system E with which Q interacts. In other words, the environment includes any apparatus used by Eve to gather information about Alice and Bob's communication. The evolution superoperator E Q thus describes all of the effects of the eavesdropper on the channel; or, to put it another way, all of the eavesdropper's efforts at "tapping" the link between Alice and Bob are contained in the interaction operator U QE . The information H Eve available to the eavesdropper will be limited by
The limitation H Eve ≤ χ E ′ holds whether or not Eve has access to the entire environment. If Eve can only see a subsystem D of the full environment, then we can make the stronger statement
. We define the "privacy" P of a channel to be
This definition makes sense, because any positive difference H Bob − H Eve can be exploited by Alice and Bob to create a reliably secret string of key bits of length about P [8] .
Alice and Bob wish to make P as large as possible. However, they cannot control the actions of the eavesdropper. Thus, they must assume that the eavesdropper is acquiring her greatest possible information from the channel. The "guaranteed privacy" P G = inf P , where the infimum is taken over all of Eve's possible strategies that are consistent with the superoperator E Q describing the channel. Since H Eve ≤ χ E ′ , we have
Alice and Bob will want to use the channel to make the guaranteed privacy P G as great as possible. Let P = sup P G be the optimal guaranteed privacy, where the supremum is taken over all strategies that Alice and Bob may employ to use the channel. How big is P? As discussed above, by suitable choice of code and decoding observable, H Bob can be made arbitrarily close to χ Q ′ . Thus,
If Alice and Bob were simply trying to optimize H Bob over a given noisy channel, it is known [7] that they can do no better than to choose pure states of Q as the inputs signal states of the channel. Here, they are instead trying to maximize the guaranteed privacy P G , so that pure state inputs may not be optimal. However, we can certainly find a lower bound for P by considering χ Q ′ − χ E ′ for pure state inputs. Assume that the states of Q initially prepared by Alice are pure states φ Q k ; also recall that the environment E can be presumed to begin in a pure state 0 E . After Q and E interact unitarily, the joint state Ψ
⊗ 0 E will also be a pure state, generally an entangled one. The subsystem states, described by density operators
will have exactly the same non-zero eigenvalues, so that S(ρ
In other words, the ability of the quantum channel to send private information is at least as great as its ability to send coherent information. This result may be viewed as a quantum information theoretic basis for quantum cryptography.
It is interesting to note that, although both χ Q ′ and χ E ′ depend on the choice of pure state inputs for the channel Q, the difference χ Q ′ − χ E ′ depends only on the overall density operator ρ Q for the inputs. We have assumed that the properties of the channel, given by the superoperator E Q , are known to Alice and Bob. If E Q is known, and if I Q > 0 for some ρ Q , then the channel may be used to send private information securely. However, this does not address the question of how Alice and Bob can establish the necessary properties of the channel without being deceived by Eve.
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